In the wake of the events which greatly modified political and economic order in Eastern Europe between the late '80s and early '90s, Italy and other Western countries had to rethink their analyses and strategies, first and foremost within the framework of the EC and NATO, and then from a national point of view.

For various reasons Italy seemed to have more difficulty than others in reviewing its objectives and strategies regarding an area with which it had long-lasting ties, to which it had devoted its attention, and where it had been present for at least the last 30 years. I do not intend to reconstruct the events that lead to this initial deadlock, but I would like to mention the main reasons, which are as follows:

1. the effect the end of contrast between the Eastern and Western blocs had on Italian national politics;

2. some problems in dealing with the Yugoslavian crisis and extreme reluctance in accepting the break-up of the Federation. One of the reasons was because, after long controversy, Italy had finally managed to establish a stable and constructive relationship with the former Yugoslavia, and this was important both from a bilateral point of view as well as from within the Balkan context;

3. after the disintegration of the former-Yugoslavia, controversies with bordering or nearby successor countries, which had been partly solved in the past or neglected and forgotten, re-surfaced.

These reasons, as well as others, including frequent changes in government (and in one case a majority), led Italy to keep a low profile (not with Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries but mainly with the Balkan area - which had been broken up into new states - and part of which was involved in war). Changes in Italian government led to changes in policy, which was sometimes even contradictory; foreign policy towards this area was often influenced and quashed by internal political issues.

Italy and Slovenia had been involved in long and complicated controversy; issues concerned the property rights of Istrian exiles in the B zone of the Free Territory of Trieste (which was never formed), the problem of minority groups, etc. To a lesser degree, Italy had the same problems with Croatia. The aforementioned facts caused Italy to initially veto Slovenia's entry to the European Union.

The situation improved when Mr. Dini's government came to power (Mrs. Susanna Agnelli was the Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Italy no longer obstacled EC negotiations with Slovenia (March 1995). Later, Mr. Prodi's government (Mr. Lamberto Dini was the Foreign Affairs minister) signed the agreement of association (June 1996) after the "Solana compromise" had been included. This compromise laid down that the problems regarding real estate belonging to the exiles would be incorporated within the framework of the entire European agreement. In short, foreigners would be allowed to own property (which was not possible up to then), and Slovenia agreed to modify its constitution. It was established that citizens of EC countries would be allowed to purchase property in Slovenia 4 years after the coming into effect of the agreement. However, EC citizens who had resided on Slovenian territory uninterruptedly for at least 3 years would be granted access to the real estate market immediately after the enforcement of the agreement. In practice, Italian exiles resident in areas forming current day Slovenia (and Austrians resident in the north-east of the country) would be able to benefit from this opportunity in advance compared to the rest of the EC citizens.

The gradual détente between Italy and Slovenia and an improvement in relationships with Croatia have characterised the foreign policy of the Dini and Prodi administrations. When the latter came to power, it decided to modify Italy's approach towards Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan area, considering these areas to be of primary interest.

The outlining of a more structural approach in dealings with this area (which has so far proved to be consistent), to be implemented within the framework and limits of Italian participation in the EU, NATO and other international organisations, is based on a complex analysis (as we shall see later) of Italian and European interests; it would greatly contribute towards stability in these areas, especially in view of Italy's geographic location.

In this paper I shall try to outline the guiding principles of the new approach of Italian foreign policy in the Balkan area. I shall also evaluate the path undertaken by the government - even from the point of view of future prospects.

 One of the main reasons for Italian interest in south-eastern Europe is its geographic location. Italy borders with Slovenia and together with Croatia it possesses most of the Adriatic coastline. Montenegro and Albania also onlook the Adriatic Sea. Furthermore, Albania is very close to the coast of the Puglia region. Italy's geographic location, as well as the cultural, economic, political and historic relationships established with these countries (as well as with Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria) have led to a strengthening of the existing relationships, which have proved to be very important and active, even during the dramatic recent events (conflict in former-Yugoslavia, the Albanian crisis, etc.).

On the other hand, the vicinity to an area where there have been recurrent crises over the last few years, naturally implying the persistence of a high degree of instability, have led to a crescendo of impending problems regarding security for Italy. This is yet another reason for its interest in implementing initiatives (along with other EU and NATO member countries) for the reconstruction or the creation of a stable situation in these countries.

The objective is to gradually integrate these countries into Western organisations, inducing them to implement policies to bring about a consolidation of democratic institutions and solve regional crises. This obligation is put into practice by means of a series of diplomatic, military and humanitarian interventions such as in the case of Bosnia (with the presence of UN troops and non-governmental organisations) and Albania (with the participation of a more limited number of countries) where Italy headed the multinational operation with a relevant involvement from a financial and humanitarian point of view, and the commitment to push forward the assistance for Albania even in the near future.

Lastly, due to the traditional relationships mentioned earlier, Italy developed important economic relations with this area, so it has felt the need to protect and strengthen these interests. Whereas Italian presence in Central and Eastern Europe is of limited economic impact compared with that of other EC partner countries such as Germany or Austria, its importance in the Balkan area is far more significant, and is sometimes relevant, especially as regards trade and in some of these countries also concerning investments.

[top] Data: 07-06-1998   Fonte: working paper, in English Autore: Walter Goruppi

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